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Résumé : Le débat sur les relations esprit–cerveau a été centré sur des ques-
tions relatives au libre arbitre. J’examine ce débat et conclus que les neu-
rosciences n’ont pas de raisons méthodologiques, ontologiques ou théoriques
convaincantes, pas plus que de raisons empiriques, pour rejeter la notion de
libre arbitre. Parallèlement, je reconnais que la question est très controversée,
à la fois en science et dans la société. Le problème se situe dans l’incompa-
tibilité entre notions scientifiques du cerveau et notions pré-scientifiques de
l’esprit. Par conséquent, je propose d’envisager les relations esprit–cerveau sur
une base empirique plus profonde et incontestée que l’on peut trouver dans
la psychophysique. Je discute deux cas dans lesquels le contenu d’une expé-
rience psychophysique, et sa dynamique, correspondent à la dynamique céré-
brale. Dans un cas, la correspondance est une identité de type ; dans l’autre,
il s’agit d’une instanciation multiple : plusieurs types radicalement différents
d’activités donnent lieu à la même dynamique perceptive. Ces deux exemples
illustrent que, bien que l’identité des types soit possible, elle peut être souvent
hautement contextualisée. Par conséquent, on doit appréhender les relations
esprit–cerveau une par une plutôt que les fonder d’un seul bloc.
Abstract: The debate on mind–brain relationships has been centered on is-
sues of free will. I investigate the debate and conclude that the neurosciences
neither have compelling methodological, ontological, theoretical reasons, nor
empirical reasons to reject the notion of free will. At the same time, I concede
that the issue is highly contentious, both in science and society. The problem
resides in the clash between scientific notions of the brain and pre-scientific
notions of mind. I therefore propose to look at mind–brain relationships on
a more sound, and uncontroversial, empirical basis, which can be found in
psychophysics. I discuss two instances in which the content of a psychophysi-
cal experience, and its dynamics, correspond to brain dynamics. In one case,
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the correspondence is a one:one type-identity, in the other it is a case of rad-
ical multiple instantiation: several radically different types of brain activity
give rise to the same perceptual dynamics. These two examples illustrate
that although type identity is possible, it may often be highly contextualized.
Mind–brain relationships are therefore more likely to be conquered one by one
rather than established wholesale.
1 Introduction
The body, including the brain, is something scientists think of in terms of
(neuro)biological mechanisms. Society, by and large, tends to follow the lead
of science in this respect; when we suffer from illness we are more likely to
consult a medical practitioner, rather than a quack. But when it comes to
the mind, we are less scientifically minded. For mental and moral advice,
we turn to self-help books, psychoanalysts, or ministers of various religious
persuasions.
Society tends to think of a conscious mind as a flow of thoughts, feelings
and sensations. These are concepts quite different from those with which
we approach the body. In the words of the late John Taylor: “It is these
characteristic differences between these two—between mind and body—that
lead to the Mind-Body problem”.1 Surely, if we describe the two in such
highly different vocabularies, it is implausible that they will ever be related in
a systematic, meaningful way. No ontological doctrine, be it dualism, idealism,
or materialism, will then ever be able to provide a satisfactory answer to the
question, what entities ultimately make up our world. It makes one wonder:
is there a more productive way of addressing the problem?
The prevalence of popular belief notwithstanding, the neurosciences have
been encroaching on the realm of mind. But these advances have evoked a
backlash. Since brain science apparently has no place for conscious, free will,
the public worries that science threatens moral responsibility. The brain as
excuse: “It wasn’t me who murdered the guy and robbed his money, your
honor; my brain did it.”
In the first part of this paper I will argue that science does not offer any
compelling arguments to exclude free will. I will also argue, however, that in
thinking of how body and mind relate, no doubt under Cartesian influence we
have been overly focused on issues of freedom of will. Free will is not the most
suitable arena for addressing the mind-body problem. As is obvious from the
public interest this issue has received, society has invested heavily in the pre-
vailing free-will talk and its cultural, legal, moral, and religious ramifications.
To enjoy a culturally unencumbered view to mind-body relationships it would
1. www.scholarpedia.org/article/Mind-body_problem:_New_approaches down-
loaded on 30-3-2012.
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be better to move to a less contested aspect of it. This I shall do in the second
part of this paper.
2 Will, conscious and free
In what way, if any, is science incompatible with free will? I will deal with
methodological, ontological, theoretical and empirical considerations. First,
let us clarify to what extent free will is barred from science on account of
methodological principles. When free will is to be considered an agency that
causes but that is not itself being caused, then sure enough any science would
oppose to it, as it is in violation of the principle that nothing happens without
a cause. The public, however, does not typically conceive of free will that
way. Rather, it considers a free will subject to external causal influences as
perfectly acceptable, as long as your decisions matter to yourself and others; in
other words, as long as they make a difference to what happens next [Nahmias
2011]. Thus, free will in the public perception is not necessarily an unmoved
mover, and science cannot object to it on these grounds.
Some authors worry that with this prevailing attitude, all brain science
could offer is a Brave New World version of free will: you are free insofar you
do what your brain is telling you to do (see, for instance [Sommers 2007]).
Such an understanding of free will may not be as grim as it seems. It will not
preclude you from changing your behavior as your brain matures, develops
or gains in experience. Neither does it stand in the way of changes through
societal or therapeutic intervention. In fact, this realization may have benefi-
cial consequences to society, in the sense that a greater understanding to the
causes of deviant behavior makes us less willing to consider retaliation and
more prone to consider therapy [Evans 2012].
Second, we may consider if there are objections in an ontological sense.
The overwhelming attitude in the science of the mind is physicalism; a kind of
materialism that proclaims that ultimately the only entities capable of causing
things are physical ones. Conceded: whatever meaning causation has in a
system of elementary particles, including bosons, gravitons, or even in such
ephemeral beasts like superstrings, differs markedly from how we understand
causation to operate in neurons, circuits and brain areas. Nevertheless, as
scientists we believe that there is no phenomenon at this level which cannot be
explained in reference to a complex of relations, laws, mechanisms, or events at
deeper level of science, ultimately all the way down to this elemental physical
reality. This, even though some theorists would permit that multiple discrete
entities at a deeper level can instantiate types featuring in higher-level theories
of science [Kim 2003]. As such higher-order concepts are necessary for the
economy of our theories, these concepts might have a certain, derived claim
to existence. Still, on account of such an understanding of “what exists”, free
will should ultimately have to be made out of physical things.
74 Cees van Leeuwen
Proposals as to what could be the “free will stuff” range from quantum un-
certainties in elementary particles to undecidability in Turing machines. The
first is highly controversial, as it is unclear how these microscopic uncertain-
ties could be “elevated” to the scale of macroscopic brain activity. Also the
second is subject to debate [Feferman s.d.]. We should distinguish between
the abstract competence of such devices and the actual performance of empir-
ical systems—only the latter should concern us here. To these, undecidability
bears no relevance. It is for such reasons that the existence of free will has
come under debate.
Within scientific discourse all claims about “what exists” can, in princi-
ple, be placed between parentheses and subject to critical examination. In
fact, there are even those who believe that the whole theoretical machinery of
science exists just for the sake of predicting things, and should therefore be
perennially parenthesized. We should not consider the existence of free will
as being under threat from science, just because its ontological status is the
subject of debate. Conversely, scientific ontology is fundamentally open to
accept new entities, should theoretical developments necessitate this.
Third, a theoretical argument against free will might seem to come from the
still popular account of mental activity as information processing: your brain
is just the hardware, on which the software of your mind is running. But the
way causation is played out in software leaves no place for free will; software
directs hardware like book music directs a street organ.2 True, hardware is
neutral with respect to whatever software you choose to run on it. To the
degree you are in conscious control of that, your free will might be seen to be
perfectly compatible with the brain. But your decision what software to run
will be made by just another piece of brain software. Like before, neither does
this one have a place for free will.
Some scientists have therefore made efforts to crush, what they consider,
the illusion of free will (e.g., [Wegner 2002]). This may sound heroic. But it
might be more like posturing. It is possible to call the well-known Müller-Lyer
illusion of size an illusion, because you have a yardstick to measure actual size.
But what is the yardstick for free will? Given how little we know, theories of
the brain cannot be the yardstick by which we can evaluate the subjective
experience of free will.
Perhaps the software/hardware metaphor is one-sided or misleading.
Recently, scientists of the mind have turned away from such concepts in favor of
the notion of dynamical self-organization. Such a view enables the emergence
2. Metaphors can be misleading, as an anonymous reviewer helpfully pointed out.
I do not mean to say that these systems proceed linearly without any branch points
(drawn as horizontal rhombs on flowcharts). Choice of branching depending on time-
dependent conditions enables true contingency in the evolution and outcome of com-
putation (consider, for example, genetic algorithms). Still, these systems are bound
to operate in finite time with mechanical causation and finite resolution. It is this
aspect which I aim to address.
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of macroscopic order (e.g., a wave of synchronized activity) from underlying
particles (e.g., firing neurons). Emergence can be said to produce a genuinely
new entity [Atmanspacher 2007], [Jordan & Ghin 2006]. Once established, it
runs on its own dynamics and thus constitutes a source of causal efficacy at a
higher level. We will see some examples in the second part of the paper. In
addition, the movements of these higher-order entities may also influence what
happens at lower level in the system [Haken & Stadler 1990]. Note: the latter
is not the same as software being run on hardware. Rather processes occurring
on a large scale are sweeping along the ones that occur on a small scale, like
the surf sweeping along the sand. Such downward causality is typically lacking
in the above-mentioned mechanical systems; yet it is quite common in physi-
cal and biological systems. It is not unlikely that it also is a characteristic of
the brain. Consider the waves in mesoscopic field potential activity (LFP) or
even the macroscopic ones that can be observed in electrocortical recordings
at the scalp (EEG). Such activity is not necessarily a mere epiphenomenon.
These waves could modulate the spiking probabilities of individual neurons
(for LFP: [Ito, Maldonado & Grun 2009], for EEG: [Radman, Su, An et al.
2007]; see also [Alexander 2007]). Emergent phenomena such as these waves
could, at least in principle, be associated with mental causation, phenomenal
experience, and free will.
This brings me to the empirical arguments. Pioneered by Libet ([Libet,
Gleason, Wright et al. 1983]; for an updated version see [Soon, Brass, Heinze
et al. 2008]), several studies have shown that we subjectively allocate our
voluntary decision to a point in time, much later than where our brain has
started the execution of a decision. These studies, however interesting, are
extremely limited in scope: they involve simple go-nogo or choice tasks in a
repetitive setting, to which the individual has limited personal involvement.
No surprise that, under these circumstances, participants run these decisions
on an automatic pilot—and our illusory experience of consciously choosing
the response comes limping afterwards. In more naturalistic settings, deci-
sions emerge in a process of extended deliberation. We do not know whether
Libet’s results generalize to these settings. The decision processes observed
by Libet and his colleagues may be too simple and sparse on recurrent ac-
tivity to allow for the above-mentioned type of processes involving downward
causality to occur.
We may conclude that there are neither methodological principles, nor on-
tological commitments, theoretical or empirical reasons for science to oppose
free will. But little do we have that speaks for it either, from a scientific point
of view. Society has invested heavily in the prevailing attitudes with respect to
this topic. There is no mature scientific understanding of free will or, for that
matter, the illusion thereof, that could substitute for these. Thus when, in the
above, the murderer’s innocence plea strikes us as absurd, perhaps, this is be-
cause of the clash of a pre-scientific understanding of mind and a scientifically
informed understanding of brain. Maybe, therefore, we should shift our view
towards aspects of conscious experience where we do have scientific knowledge
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of. A worthier endeavor would be to confront the scientific understanding of
the brain with a scientific understanding of the mind.
3 Objective consciousness
There are mature branches of science representing an integral part of percep-
tion research that are studying conscious experience. Think of psychophysics
and the studies of the visual perception of structure and shape that have
emerged from experimental phenomenology [Kanizsa & Luccio 1995], [Metzger
1934], for instance [Kubovy, Holcombe & Wagemans 1998] or [Van Lier 1999].
Let us refer to the data collected by such sciences as “objective experience”.
Objective experience includes a range of scientific results. Psychophysics
has been dealing with, amongst other things: visual detection and discrimi-
nation of colors, contrasts, contrast polarities, spatial frequencies and motion,
auditory detection or discrimination of pitch in pure tones, noise levels, tim-
bre; there are also many studies involving olfaction, taste and touch sensation;
proprioception, and pain. “Experimental Phenomenology” has been dealing
with issues like figural complexity, symmetry, occlusion and the role of per-
ception in action planning. Not only do psychophysicists and experimental
phenomenologists know how to collect their data without being contaminated
by things like response bias, importantly there are theoretical laws which can
be applied to quantitatively predict these data: signal detection (SD) theory
[Wickens 2002], adaptation level theory [Helson 1964] and, for structure and
shape: Structural Information Theory [van der Helm 2012].
No scientist, not even a radical behaviorist, would deny the reliability
of these data. Several would, perhaps, want to question their “experiential”
status. Such critique seems far off the mark: psychophysics asks observers to
report on aspects of what they see, hear or feel. By fitting theoretical curves to
these data, such as the ROC curve in signal detection theory, qualia are being
turned into quantia. This, however, without losing the transparent relation to
first-person experience: would your experience have been different, so would
your ROC curve.
The reliability of scientific observations in objective experience notwith-
standing, objective experience is not the same as reliable experience. How
reliable objective experience is may vary from one case to another. Observers
may be remarkably accurate in localizing a sound source by using the differ-
ence in phases between the inputs of both ears, but are otherwise remarkably
bad at localizing a sound in space. As a result, they will only rely on visual
rather than on auditory localization, except when visual resolution is poor (see
the ventriloquist effect, [Alais & Burr 2004]).
Understanding objective experience still belongs to what David Chalmers
[Chalmers 1996] qualified as “the hard problem”. Like the pre-theoretical cat-
egory of “subjective experience”, objective experience is individual and essen-
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tially so. It is your decision and yours alone, whether a stimulus in a signal-
detection experiment is actually there, or not. You could, of course, be faking
your participation. But this would easily be found out: no ROC curve would
fit your data. Since they would have to fake their participation, Chalmers’
philosophical zombies would fail this test [Chalmers 1996]. More generally:
we can dispute the status of objective experience, when necessary, by hold-
ing up observed data against established theories and methods of scientific
observation.
Note that the concept of “objective experience” allows various degrees of
skepticism about the veracity of people’s subjective experience, as it is ex-
pressed in introspective reports, in literature. Objective experience does not
necessarily overlap onto subjective experiences. The former sometimes allows
us to “correct” the latter. Let us consider the psychophysics of pain [Gracely
2012], [Lloyd & Appel 1976]. Based on sound experimentation and rigorous
application of signal detection theory, the phrase: “You think you are in pain,
but in fact you are not” or likewise: you are denying your pain”, would both
be meaningful and truth-valuable scientific statements.
It may seem odd to deny such quintessential a first-person experience, but
consider what Adam Swenson writes on his painblog:
Many writers—at least those working in ethics and axiology—
seem to assume that pains are essentially phenomenological
(where ‘phenomenology’ refers to the hurting of the pain) and only
accidentally associated with emotions, affect, expectation, etc.
[...] They assume that there is some discrete neural phenomenon
corresponding to the discrete phenomenological phenomenon—
the pain. [...] I, of course, think this picture of what pains are is
a mistake. I think that pains are best understood as having cer-
tain emotional, desiderative, conative, and affective components
essentially.3
In other words, what we experience as pain may have an entrenched, complex
and dynamical structure that is hard to be univocally expressed.
To what extent efforts to “correct” subjective experience are effective is
another matter. The simple adage that holds for psychotherapeutic practice,
should equally be held up against thought experiments suggesting a scientific
reform program promoting something like “my C-fibers are firing” to replace:
“I feel a pain”. Let us ignore for the sake of the argument that, for pain and
other complex, dynamic phenomena, a correspondence to a highly static brain
component such as implied in “C-fibers firing” is most unlikely. Given how
theory-laden our folk language for describing our experience is, the argument
goes; adopting a new language will change, and perhaps even allow more
differentiation in our description of experience. The proposal fails to take into
3. http://dolor.blogspot.com/2004/05/thoughts-about-c-fibers-firing.html
downloaded on 27-04-2012.
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account how much the way we describe our experience is culturally entrenched;
for this reason, even if we would prefer such a new vocabulary, experience will
stubbornly refuse to be affected by it.
This stubbornness may resemble the resistance to change in visual illu-
sions. For instance, observers stubbornly mistake the lengths of the familiar
Müller-Lyer figure. The concept of objective experience motivates us to take
this result seriously. Rather than as an error in need of correction, a more
productive way of treating them would be, for instance, as an adaptation to
what life requires to an observer, such as having to estimate lengths from a
single 2-dimensional projection of a 3-dimensional world. We should, perhaps,
principally consider experiences as adaptations, and how well individuals man-
age their worlds with them, rather than merely dismiss their expressions as
illusion. This will certainly apply to pain. Yet, because pain is such a complex,
dynamic phenomenon, the analogy with the Müller-Lyer illusion breaks down
beyond this point. Compared to the Müller-Lyer illusion, complex sensations
such as pain may be more liable to theory-ladenness of observation. Thus,
whereas the Müller-Lyer is resistant against cognitive penetration because of
the way it is evolutionarily entrenched, our experience of pain may be resistant
because of the way it is culturally entrenched.
4 Case studies in mind–brain relationship
I claim that, once phrased in its scientific form—that is as a relation between
objective consciousness and brain, we can begin to consider the mind–brain
problem as solvable, at least in principle. Let it be understood that the mind-
body problem is unlikely to be conquered wholesale, by some magnificent
masterstroke. In what follows I will report on my own efforts to solve the
problem in a piecemeal fashion. I will provide two examples, both of which
involve ambiguous figures. These are stimuli that can give rise to at least two
alternative interpretations.
A certain degree of ambiguity is characteristic of every visual pattern.
Although several interpretations are principally possible, one or a few are
typically preferred. We adopted a paradigm from psychophysics, in which
the perceived grouping of dot lattices is being studied [Kubovy, Holcombe &
Wagemans 1998]. In these experiments, a single stimulus parameter theoreti-
cally determines the degree of ambiguity: proximity (see Figure 1A). Proximity
determines perceived grouping through a simple relationship called Aspect
Ratio (AR). The larger AR, the stronger is the preference for grouping ac-
cording to the smallest distance (a); the more AR approaches 1, the weaker
the preference, i.e., the more ambiguous the dot pattern.
In a recent study [Nikolaev, Gepshtein, Gong et al. 2010], we recorded
electrocortical activity (EEG) at the scalp, evoked by the onset of the pre-
sentation of a dot lattice. In such visually evoked brain activity, we studied
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the oscillatory activity that typically accompanies the enhancement of a focus
of mental activity in dedicated brain regions. These oscillations synchronize
from time to time and, after some time interval, desynchronization occurs.
Sometimes, the synchronization spreads to encompass an entire brain region.
We called this phenomenon of emerging macroscopic order a coherence inter-
val [van Leeuwen, Steyvers & Nooter 1997], [van Leeuwen, Gong & Nikolaev
2002]. We had prior determined the location on the scalp where evoked ac-
tivity was sensitive to AR [Nikolaev, Gepshtein, Kubovy et al. 2008]. At this
location we now measured the durations of coherence intervals (Figure 2). We
considered these durations in relation to the aspect ratio of the dot lattice.
We found a simple, linear relationship (Figure 1B).
Figure 1: (Adapted from [Nikolaev, Gepshtein, Gong et al. 2010]). A. Grouping
preference (columns vs. rows) as a function of Aspect Ratio (AR), based on the
Gestalt principle of proximity. B. The mean (N=8) duration of intervals of phase
synchrony derived from evoked EEG in the parieto-occipital scalp areas as a function
of AR. Dot lattice stimuli corresponding to AR=1.0 and AR=1.3 are shown under
the graph.
The relationship could be understood if we realize that aspect ratio reflects
ambiguity of the lattice, and that ambiguity means absence of information.
Thus the less ambiguity there is, the more information. Therefore, the more
information contained in the pattern, the longer the coherence interval lasts. In
addition, the steepness of the slope in coherence interval length as a function of
aspect ratio in individual observers strongly correlated across observers to how
sensitive they are to AR. In sum, we may therefore conclude that coherence
intervals directly reflect the amount of stimulus information detected.
The observed coherence intervals have a clearly established meaning in
terms of a brain mechanism. Coherence of activity is known to facilitate
transfer of information [Fries 2005]. The length of the coherence interval thus
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reflects the time the particular brain area sensitive to AR needs to transmit
the information it has computed to the rest of the brain. But transmission of
information in the brain occurs with different delays, depending on facts such
as path length, axonal cable length and white matter myelination, synaptic
efficacy, etc. It is always the slowest signal that determines the completion
of transmission. The more channels are involved, the slower the slowest one
tends to be. For the systematic differences to be substantial (approx. 40 ms
differences were observed), the transmission has to occur at the scale of the
entire brain. Coherence intervals, thus, represent global broadcasting of visual
information. Global broadcasting has been proposed as a function of conscious
awareness [Dehaene, Kerszberg & Changeux 1998], [Sergent & Dehaene 2004].
The correspondence between visual experience and brain mechanism would
go beyond a simple correlation of mind and brain activity. First, the obser-
vation was made in an experimental setting, which excludes other factors.
Therefore, the effect of the independent variable, AR, can be interpreted as
causal. Second, the independent variable was not a subjective experience, but
an objective one: AR is an established and quantitatively specific theoretical
predictor of ambiguity. Third, the brain activity is understood theoretically
as having a function associated with consciousness. For these reasons, we may
propose the coherence intervals as having an identity relation to conscious
experience.
The identity is constitutive of the psychological present [Stroud 1955]. The
psychological present is the time window in which events are perceived as tem-
porally contiguous. A psychological present is necessary, physiologically speak-
ing, to accommodate differences in transmission delays between neural cables
[Pöppel 1970] as in particular for perceiving movement [Mortensen 2012].
The Reichardt motion detector (M) receives input from photore-
ceptors R1 and R2, which respond to luminance change. Because
there is a longer delay from R1 to M than from R2 to M , the
detector will respond to an object moving to the right. [Kline,
Holcombe & Eagleman 2004, 2655]
But the detector will have to accept the delay when it attributes the two inputs
to the same source.
Note that the identity considered here is between a mental phenomenon
and a dynamically assembled, self-organized brain activity. This is not unim-
portant. As with the waves mentioned earlier, coherence intervals are caused
by the collective movements of particles. But once set in motion, these move-
ments determine whether a visual pattern is consciously registered [Nakatani,
Ito, Nikolaev et al. 2005]. Thus, it means that a phenomenon at this high-level
of organization, once brought into existence, is perfectly well capable of causing
other events at that level. In other words the brain has, through its own activ-
ity, produced the conditions for mental causation. In turn, the activity at the
pattern level modulates that of the different particles that collectively produce
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it. This means, specifically, that differences in coherence interval lengths will
result in differences in perception and behavior. For these, see [van Leeuwen
& Smit 2012].
Figure 2: (Adapted from [Nikolaev, Gepshtein, Gong et al. 2010]). A “coherence
interval” is obtained as the duration of sub-threshold SD amongst dynamic pair-wise
synchronizations within an electrode chain, placed over a scalp region of observed
ERP activity following presentation of a dot-lattice.
We just observed a scientific identity of a mental and a brain type, albeit
within the narrow confines of an experiment. Before we turn too optimistic
and start thinking about mind–brain identity and dual-aspect theories, allow
me to present another piece of research to demonstrate that such identity can-
not be taken for granted. This is true, in particular, if we turn from evoked
to spontaneous activity. Let us consider another case of perceptual ambiguity.
Observing ambiguous figures typically results in perceptual switching ; the per-
ception of the figure reverses without any changes to the figure itself [Attneave
1971], [Leopold & Logothetis 1999]. In other words, perceivers experience these
changes as spontaneous. This, of course, has to be an illusion, as nothing hap-
pens without a cause. We experience these reversals, moreover, as sudden,
instantaneous events. This, too may be an illusion, what is experienced as
sudden may be considered as a product of an underlying, continuous dynam-
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ics [Spivey 2007]. Nakatani and van Leeuwen studied the brain events leading
up to perceptual switching and found that several brain activity patterns oc-
cur in the run up to a switching response [Nakatani & van Leeuwen 2006];
these patterns typically are transient episodes of synchronized activity in the
gamma range in higher brain scalp regions, some of which occurred as early
as 1 s prior to the switching response. Ito et al. showed that 1,100 ms prior to
the button press switching-related eye events occur, suggesting that already at
this time the switching process may have begun [Ito, Nikolaev, Luman et al.
2003]. Responding to an external change the same stimulus takes, on average,
only 574 ms [Nakatani, Orlandi & van Leeuwen 2011]. So we may safely as-
sume that if a certain brain or oculomotor event occurs more 1,000 ms prior to
a button-press response with which an observer indicates having experienced
a switch, that event will have preceded the conscious experience of the switch.
Brain and oculomotor activity leading to switching occurs at least approx.
500 ms before the conscious experience. Thus, the sudden and instantaneous
character of switching may be considered an illusion.
Following my own previous suggestion, I consider the adaptive significance
of these illusions. If we would perceive the actual time course of the change,
it would involve us in an intricate process of visual destabilization and re-
stabilization that carries no relevant information whatsoever about the world.
The visual system, in other words, protects us against such an irrelevant visual
experience. The mechanism of this is not known, but may be similar to what
happens during fast eye-movements, or saccades. During these movements, our
eyes continue to receive stimulation; the extent and duration of the stimulation
is such that we might expect it to be highly salient. We might have expected
a horrendous blur of our visual experience. Yet, this does not happen. A
mechanism called transient on sustained inhibition protects us against it. As
a result, we experience our world to be stable across saccades. Likewise, if
we were to envisage the causes of our voluntary decision as the process it is,
instead of a unique moment of volition, we would probably be evoking a slew
of thoughts, associations, and fears. This shows that volition, as switching, is
a construct of the brain aimed to protect ourselves from information overload.
Recent studies stress in perceptual switching the importance of both low-
level (sensory) and high-level (cognitive) processes. In other words, here in the
case of pain, the situation is complicated and involves many different brain
systems. In a series of experimental studies [Nakatani, Ito, Nikolaev et al.
2005], [Nakatani & van Leeuwen 2006], [Nakatani, Orlandi & van Leeuwen
2011, 2012], we showed that several of these processes lead to switching inde-
pendently over time, even in the same individual. We took these results to
indicate that perceptual switching is a radically multiply realizable process,
in that various neurological states can instantiate it in a single individual at
different times.
When first introduced by Putnam, multiple realizability, the idea that
mental states may be variously instantiated by neurological states, was widely
accepted [Putnam 1967/1975]. The idea was first intended to apply primar-
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ily to differences in instantiation across species. If we are correct, perceptual
switching is more radically multiply realizable than that. Within the same
species and, in fact, even within the same individual, the sequence of eye and
brain events that instantiates reversing varies from one time to another. Kim
has argued that multiple realizability is an obstacle to mental causation [Kim
2003]. It is either empty (the underlying brain mechanisms do the causing) or,
if not, it would impose an extra cause on an already physically determined sys-
tem. But in a system with both upward (particles to pattern) and downward
(pattern to particles) causality, multiple realizability is merely a complication,
not an obstacle.
Radical multiple instantiation stands in the way of a quick and whole-
sale mind–brain identification program. These results are perfectly consistent,
however, with a contextualized type identity: in some specific situations, when
certain activity emerges within the brain, that activity is type-identical with
mental activity: brain-in-context equals mind. But we need to be able to
identify the correspondence one by one.
5 Conclusions
According to science, nothing in principle stands in the way of free will. But
not much speaks for it either. At the same time, there are important obstacles
to a scientific resolution of the problem of free will. When we move away
from such a contested issue, and are willing to step aside from established
information processing theories, we find that the mind–brain problem may
actually be closer to a solution than we think. Piecewise solutions are already
on offer, as is exemplified in the two cases with ambiguous stimuli I discussed,
but these also illustrate that solutions will probably not be achieved wholesale.
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